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Physical entities are ultimately (re)constructed from elementary yes/no events, in particular clicks
in detectors or measurement devices recording quanta. Recently, the interpretation of certain such
clicks has given rise to unfounded claims which are neither necessary nor sufficient, although they
are presented in that way. In particular, clicks can neither inductively support nor “(dis)prove”
the Kochen-Specker theorem, which is a formal result that has a deductive proof by contradiction.
More importantly, the alleged empirical evidence of quantum contextuality, which is “inferred” from
violations of bounds of classical probabilities by quantum correlations, is based on highly nontrivial
assumptions, in particular on physical omniscience.
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Time and again, in coffee houses and elsewhere, mem-
bers of the Viennese experimental physics community re-
minded me always to keep in mind that all our physical
“facts” are ultimately derived and constructed from de-
tector clicks. It is this basic wisdom that, when con-
sequentially applied to recent experiments, suggests to
rethink certain claims of empirical proof.
Let us, for the sake of properly assessing the situation,
review some historical cornerstones. Motivated by cer-
tain, as it turned out inapplicable, no-go theorems by
von Neumann regarding hidden parameters, Bell came
forward with criteria for classical probabilities and ex-
pectations, resembling the conditions of possible experi-
ence that had been contemplated by Boole a century ear-
lier [1]. Essentially, these criteria state that, if one forces
the (counterfactual) physical co-existence upon certain
finite sets of complementary, incompatible, potential ob-
servables – meaning that every single one could be mea-
sured, although due to complementarity it is impossible
to simultaneously measure all of them – the associated
potential measurement outcomes are subject to certain
algebraic bounds.
As these probabilistic bounds are not satisfied by
quantum observables, the respective measurements out-
comes cannot consistently co-exist [2]; at least not un-
der the classical presumptions entering the calculations
leading to these bounds. These arguments have subse-
quently been strengthened by the Kochen-Specker and
the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger theorems, as for the lat-
ter ones any violations of the conditions of possible expe-
rience must occur on every single quantum and at least
for a single observable [3] rather than occasionally.
Those results relate to situations in which omniscience
is assumed; that is, all observables which could poten-
tially be observed can indeed be associated with actual
elements of physical reality of a single quantum. For a
realist this might appear self-evident [4]. Also for exper-
imentalists this seems to be obvious; after all, any par-
ticular observation renders outcomes, regardless of the
mutual complementarity of some of the observables in-
volved; in this view, “potentially operational” means “ex-
istence.” By this inkling, the situation suggests that the
measurement “reveals” a pre-existing element of physi-
cal reality of the quantum observed. Stated pointedly,
registration of some detector clicks is interpreted as a
revelation about what is taken as the quantized object.
If these pre-existing elements of physical reality are
taken for granted, it is not unreasonable to “solve” or
“explain” the conundrum imposed by the various afore-
mentioned theorems by assuming that any potential mea-
surement outcome may depend on whatever other maxi-
mal co-measurable collection of observables (the context,
interpretable as maximal operator [5, sect. 84]) are co-
measured alongside. This dependency of the outcome of
a single quantum measurement on its context is termed
contextuality.
Note that the Born rule, and also Gleason’s theorem,
requires the quantum probabilities and expectations, and
thus all quantum statistical properties, to be noncontex-
tual. Notice also that contextuality attempts to main-
tain a realistic, omniscient, quasi-classical framework by
abandoning context independence for single quantum ob-
servables.
Now, if one maintains realistic omniscience – that is,
the pre-existence of all outcomes of complementary po-
tential observables – then it is indeed true that, as stated
by Cabello [6], “the immense majority of the experimen-
tal violations of Bell inequalities [[proves]] quantum con-
textuality.” Actually, the only difference between older
evidence of violations of Bell-type inequalities and more
recent ones [7–10] seems to be based on the fact that the
prior ones rely on spatially separated quanta in Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen “explosion” type schemes, whereas more
recent ones are based on single quanta – a concept which
appears to be more in the spirit of Kochen-Specker type
theorems which apply to the structure of observables
2of single quanta [11]. But even these sorts of empiri-
cal findings referring to single quanta rely on the non-
instantaneous measurement of all but a few (mostly two
or three in cases involving two- or three-particle Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen and Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger type)
configurations, and therefore cannot even counterfactu-
ally assure the operational existence of all elements of
physical reality at once [12].
Alas, these assumptions are neither necessary (and suf-
ficient), as other, rather exotic options [13, 14] demon-
strate, nor is there any more direct empirical evi-
dence in their support. Indeed, quantum predictions
of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setups involving singlet
states of qutrits suggest that contextuality cannot be ob-
served [15], although a direct experimental test is still
lacking.
Thus with regards to quantum contextuality, the sit-
uation is rather discomforting: insofar as contextuality
seems to “explain” various findings related to quantum
predictions and correlations, it can only be indirectly in-
ferred by assuming some extra assumptions, including
classical omniscience; otherwise it is not necessary. And
insofar it could be directly testable it is very unlikely to
show up. Because of this dilemma, it is suggested to
re-evaluate recent empirical findings in terms of a much
broader picture of value indefiniteness; including also the
possibility that there needs not exist a pre-existing ele-
ment of physical reality associated with certain observ-
ables.
In certain situations the experimental outcomes ac-
tually measured might not originate from such pre-
existence, but might depend on the interaction between
the quantum measured and the measurement apparatus.
Pointedly stated, the outcome might not reflect an intrin-
sic objective physical property of the quantized object,
but rather originate in the way a measurement apparatus
generates the outcome by interacting with the quantum.
Already Bell [16] suggested that “the result of an obser-
vation may reasonably depend . . . on the complete dis-
position of the apparatus.” Perhaps this was also what
Bohr had in mind by mentioning [17] “the impossibility
of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic
objects and the interaction with the measuring instru-
ments which serve to define the conditions under which
the phenomena appear.”
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